Delegation is a key feature of political decission making: Mayors or prime ministers delegate to subordinates, voters delegate to elected representatives. We analyze the e¤ect of political delegation on public service provision and the choice between private or public providers when contracts are incomplete and incentives therefore distorted. We identify two important e¤ects: The incentive e¤ ect increases the incentive part of service providers' remuneration and delegation may therefore be a substitute for an explicit complete incentive contract. The bargaining e¤ ect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private …rm with market power. In general, these e¤ects imply that delegation improves public service provision.
Introduction
Public services are fundamental aspects of modern wefare states. They claim a signi…cant part of government budgets and are in most societies subject to stark political debates. During the last decades private procurement of public services has been increasingly common (see surveys by World Bank 1995, Shleifer 1998 , and Megginson and Netter 2001) . Key aspects of public and private service contracting are often subject to political delegation: Prime ministers', mayors' and other politicians'calendars are so packed that they are forced to delegate important part of the contracting, monitoring and renegotiation with public and private service providers to to subordinates. Furthermore, in representative democracy, voters delegate politcial decisions to elected representatives. In this article, we analyze how delegation of political decission making in ‡uences both the quality and cost of public service provision and the incentives to outsource to private contractors.
In many areas, such as health, child and elderly care, police or military service, where it is di¢ cult to describe, monitor and contract upon quality, the outsourcing of public service provision involves a trade o¤ between cost and quality. 1 Focusing on this case, we consider a simple framework where a principal delegates to a politically motivated agent: Our model is su¢ ciently general to cover both the case of a mayor or prime minister who delegates to a politically motivated subordinate (or NGO) to decide on the service provision and the case of representative democracy where voters (in e¤ect the median voter) elect a politician. We show that delegation can be used strategically to provide service providers with better incentives and to counter private market power and that it therefore has important implications for the public budget and the e¤ects of outsourcing.
We consider a world where contracts are necessarily incomplete as in Hart (1995) . The incompleteness of contracts makes direct incentive contracts unfeasible and makes the service provider's incentives indirect and come through renegotiation of the contract. The incentives are therefore in general not optimal and typically stronger (for good and bad) in the private sector where the …rm is the residual claimant. In our model, this implies that a government faces a cost-quality trade o¤ when it chooses between contracting with a public or a private service provider.
We build on the framework of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) but extend this in three ways:
First, we take into account that the public manager is hired in a market and that his total pay therefore re ‡ects the outside option this market provides for him. Secondly, we consider the case where there may be market power in the private sector. Thirdly, we assume that even though contracting with the …rm is not complete, there is a possibility that the govenment can block cost reductions in the …rm since they hurt quality. In this case, the …rm and the government will renegotiate and split the surplus (if any is present) from implementing the cost reductions.
We identify two important e¤ects of delegation: The incentive and the bargaining e¤ ects. The principal can in ‡uence the service provider's incentives by delegating the future renegotiation of the contract to an agent with di¤erent preferences. For instance, an agent who is more keen on cost reductions is willing to pay the service provider more for reducing cost. The service provider therefore has a larger incentive to spend e¤ort on cost reductions when he foresees contract renegotiations with such an agent. The principal likes the stronger incentives, but dislikes the higher payment. However, when the initial contract is made with service provider, the income from the renegotiation is taken into account and the …xed pay is lowered since the service providers's total pay re ‡ects his outside option. The incentive e¤ ect of delegation, therefore, e¤ectively shifts part of the …xed pay towards incentive based pay. Hence, delegation essentially substitutes for an explicit incentive contract.
Secondly, delegation may counter private market power through the bargaining e¤ ect. Depending on agents' preferences on the cost-quality trade o¤ they will be more or less keen to outsource. The principal can take advantage of this by delegating to an agent, who only reluctantly outsources. Facing a high price from the private …rm, this agent will not outsource, which forces the …rm to lower the price. The bargaining e¤ ect implies, therefore, that delegation is an e¤ective tool for achieving lower prices from private service providers. The appointment of an agent reluctant to outsource forms a credible commitment to a tough stance in the bargaining.
In many cases, delegation is necessary because of the simple fact that leading politicians (whether prime ministers, presidents or mayors) have limited time and packed calendars. This implies that the important political choice for them is whom to delegate to. This is also the situation voters face in a representative democracy. The institutional framework has implications for the range of possibilities. In many countries, the law prescribes that certain services, such as policing, defence, and central services of the welfare state like elderly care or parts of public medicare, should be provided by the public sector; from the perspective of the politician there is mandatory inhouse provision. Even though outsourcing is not an option, the principal may delegate the authority to contract with the public manager. In other situations, outsourcing is an option. Then there are two distinct sets decisions, the outsourcing decision as well as authority to renegotiate the contract with the chosen service provider. The principal may delegate both decisions to one agent, we denote this case arm's length delegation. A prominent case is representative democracy, where voters delegate these decisions to an elected representative.
Other prominent cases are where a prime minister delegates to a department minister with full powers or where a government delegates to an NGO.
We also consider partial delegation, where the principal decides on "the big decision" whether the service should be outsourced or not but delegates the authority to renegotiate midway with the service provider; for example, the prime minister takes the outsourcing decision and leaves the subsequent authority to a resort minister or a referendum on outsourcing was held among voters and an elected representative was in charge of the midway renegotiation with the service provider. Finally, as a benchmark, we shortly discuss double delegation where each decision is delegated to di¤erent independent agents.
Under partial delegation delegation always improves e¢ ciency. The principal chooses the agent exclusively with an eye on the incentive e¤ ect and the renegotiation. In fact, the incentive e¤ ect implies that for a large part of the parameter space (as long as solutions in the model are interior), delegation leads to …rst best. From an e¢ ciency point of view, partial delegation is the optimal institution. Under arm's length delegation the principal's choice of agent is motivated both by the outsourcing decision and the subsequent recontracting. These two motives implies that the incentive e¤ ect is not exclusively in focus. If the principal prefers a particular mode of provision, she has to make sure that the agent also prefers this mode, and this sometimes limits the avaliable choices. Furthermore, when the principal prefers oursourcing, she has an eye on the bargaining e¤ ect. In the end, arm's length delegation may improve e¢ ciency compared with no delegation, this is when the principal prefers inhouse provision and takes advantage of the incentive e¤ ect.
When however, outsourcing is chosen, the bargaining e¤ ect dominates (in large parts of the parameter space) and this actually may hurt e¢ ciency.
For the principal there is always the option to delegate to a type like herself; if she does something else, it is because it improves her situation. The option to use the incentive e¤ ect without worrying about whether the agent will outsource or not makes partial delegation best when the principal prefers inhouse provision. When, however, the principal prefers outsourcing the bargaining e¤ ect may imply that she prefers arm's length delegation. The paper contains a proposition giving the full characterization.
The outsourcing decision in equilibrium is the same under no delegation and arm's length delegation, while outsourcing is optimal for a larger range of parameter values under partial delegation. Hence, delegation may lead to more outsourcing, but does not necessarily do so.
In a representative democracy voters delegate decisions to politicians as is the case under arm's length delegation. An interpretation of the model is that the principal is the median voter and the agent the elected politician. It is hardly realistic to assume that voters could do without delegation of the renegotiation authority. However, one could imagine that major decisions regarding outsourcing of the services of the welfare state are put to referenda. This would be like partial delegation. We show that there is outsourcing for a larger range of parameters under partial delegation, hence the model predicts that referenda should make outsourcing more likely.
The theoretical literature has focused on welfare consequences of privatization and outsourcing focusing on asymmetric information (La¤ont and Tirole (1991) , Schmidt (1996) and Shapiro and Willig (1993) ), political failures (Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Bennedsen (1999)) and incomplete contracting (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 Levin and Tadelis (2005) show the importance of transaction costs in contracting when local governments decide on outsourcing of public services. The latter study develops a measure of contracting di¢ culty of di¤erent services and shows that it is strongly correlated with whether services are provided inhouse in US municipalities. This literature documents that political preferences, degree of contractual incompleteness and complexity of service provisions are all important factors in deciding the type of service provision. Our analysis highlights that delegation is a powerful instrument in such environments.
Our model focuses on the trade o¤ between cost and quality of service provision. We believe that this trade o¤ is essential in many kind of governmental services although not all. The quality shading hypothesis argues that quality may deteriorate when service production is transferred The structure of the paper is as follows: The basic framework with the benchmark case of no delegation is considered in section 2. Inhouse provision and delegation under mandatory inhouse provision is studied in section 3. Section 4 considers outsourcing and delegation under mandatory outsourcing. The di¤erent kinds of delegation are analyzed in section 3, while the principal's ranking of these are discussed in section 4. Partial and arm's length delegation are considered in section 5 and 6. E¢ ciency and the principal's preferred mode of delegation is discussed in section 7. Section 8 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
The basic framework
The government provides a service, which can be produced inhouse or outsourced. Apart from providing the service, the crucial task faced in service provision is a reduction of cost. The service provider -whether the public manager or the …rm -performs cost reducing e¤ort, e; at a private cost of 1 2 e 2 which results in plans. E¤ort is observable but ex ante non-contractible: The service provider's investment in cost reduction is observable but not veri…able to third parties, i.e. it cannot be written into contracts that are enforceable ex post. 4 The total costs of producing the service consists of remuneration of the manager (if such a one is present) plus other costs. If the cost reduction plans are implemented, the non-managerial cost of producing the service is
If the government produces inhouse, the government bears the total costs. In case of outsourcing, the …rm bears the cost, but is paid a price from the government to provide the service. The …rm is owned by its manager so it has no managerial wage cost.
If the cost reduction plans are implemented, the quality of the service will be reduced to
The parameter 0 re ‡ects how severe the quality e¤ect is. The principal cares about public service provision and likes quality, Q; but dislikes the government expenditure associated with paying the total costs of the service Y: Her utility is
where p 0 is the weight she puts on quality. The gross surplus from cost reducing e¤ort is therefore s(e; p ; ) = 1 p e:
In the sequel, we will focus on the case, where the principal faces a genuine trade o¤ so the optimal solution involves some cost reduction, i.e. the case where p 1= :
The principal may retain the decision rights and herself perform the necessary negotiations with the public manager or the private …rm. It may however also be possible that she can delegate the decision authority to an agent. The principal can choose among politically motivated agents, who care about quality and cost; they have utility functions like (3), but have di¤erent weights on quality, a . We will assume that potential agents are su¢ ciently heterogeneous so that for any positive a there is an agent with a : We exclude the existence of malevolent agents, with a < 0; who bene…t directly from low quality public service. It would, in fact, make the analysis simpler, if we did not impose this -reasonable -restriction.
Inhouse provision
We …rst consider inhouse provision and the case where there is no delegation. Here the principal is the decision maker for the government. Under inhouse provision, the principal hires a manager at the market for managers at a …xed wage w. When hired, the manager spends e¤ort, e in order to come up with plans for cost reduction. With total income I, and e¤ort level, e; his utility is
Since e¤ort is non-contractible, the manager's contract gives no direct incentive to perform it. However, after e¤ort is performed, the plans are tangible and it is possible to write a contract specifying that he should implement them. The parties then renegotiate his contract.
If negotiations break down, the principal can replace the manager, but only a fraction 1 of the gross gains can be realized, since the new manager does not have the detailed knowledge and human capital of the old manager. The size of depends on how important the human capital of the manager is. One would expect this to be very important if the service is very complicated and technical, and cost reductions involve serious R&D, while it perhaps is smaller if the service is less complicated like for instance cleaning. 5 In the sequel, we will conceive of as re ‡ecting the "technicality" of the task. As the government can recoup 1 even without the manager, the gains from renegotiation consist of the other fraction ; which is split evenly so the manager's total income I = w + 2 s(e; p ; ): The manager foresees this so his optimizing e¤ort choice is
if p 1= and zero otherwise.
At the hiring stage, the parties foresee the upcoming renegotiation 6 and the wage w makes 5 Notice, that one could conceive of situations where even in simple tasks like cleaning, human capital is important, e.g. because of good sta¤ relations. 6 Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997 assume that the public manager receives a …xed wage weakly larger than his outside option. It is implicit in this formulation that the government does not foresee the renegotiation implying that the manager ends up with a total compensation strictly larger than his outside option. We believe that a rational government recognizes that it can lower the …xed part of the manager's remuneration below the the manager indi¤erent between taking the job and going for his outside option, which we normalize to 0; so 
and her utility from in-house provision is
which becomes
The …rst best level of e¤ort maximizes the net surplus between the manager and the principal,
otherwise it is zero. The contractual incompleteness lead to ine¢ ciency under inhouse provision:
Since the renegotiation only gives the public manager part of the surplus generated by his e¤ort, it provides him with too weak incentives and his e¤ort level, given by (6), is too low.
Delegation under mandatory inhouse provision
Here, inhouse provision is mandatory, but the principal may delegate the authority to contract and renegotiate with the manager after he has come up with the plans for cost reduction to a politically motivated agent. The agent has a utility function like the principal's but he may value quality di¤erently, agent a puts weight a on quality. Such an agent will therefore achieve a di¤erent negotiation result with the manager. When the manager faces renegotiation with agent a ; his optimal e¤ort choice is given by e in ( a ; ; ) : The principal can take advantage of this. Mandatory inhouse provision occurs for instance when the law prescribes that municipalities cannot outsource primary school provision, hospital services or elderly care. Principal 0 p s utility when the renegotiation with the public manager is delegated to agent a becomes
relevant reservation wage, because both manager and government know that additional payment will follow in the renegotiation process. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny brie ‡y discuss the possibility that the manager o¤ers the government some of his post contractual rent but catagorize such actions as corruption. The principal takes advantage of the incentive e¤ ect of delegation. She bears in mind that too little e¤ort is spent by the public manager on cost reductions, since he only internalizes =2
of the gross surplus, cf. (6) and (10). This problem is countered by choosing an agent who cares less about quality than the principal. This agent is more favorable to cost reductions, so the surplus from cost reductions is higher when the public manager renegotiates with the agent than with the principal. The manager receives part of the surplus, so his marginal pay from putting more e¤ort into cost reductions is higher and he responds by making more e¤ort. While the principal likes the higher e¤ort, she dislikes the increased pay to the manager. However, this is partly o¤set in the initial contracting. The public manager is hired at the competitive market for managers, so his total pay will cover his e¤ort cost plus his outside option. When signing the initial contract with the agent, he rationally foresees the income from the renegotiation and is willing to accept a lower base wage. Hence, the principal only ends up covering the manager's extra e¤ort cost. The incentive e¤ ect implies that a larger fraction of the manager's pay is related to incentives. Delegation, therefore, substitutes for a formal incentive contract. Notice, it is crucial for delegation to work that the renegotiation outcome is foreseen at the time of the initial contracting with the service provider. 8 The preferred agent values quality more, the more severe the quality e¤ects of cost reductions are. The preferred agent also values quality more, when is higher. In this case, the incentive problem faced by the public manager is less, and hence the principal does not need to rely so heavily on the incentive e¤ect. In fact, it is quick to check that the principal's gain in utility from delegating is decreasing in : Assuming that is higher for more technical tasks as argued above, we would expect the incentive e¤ect and the delegation to be more important for less technical tasks. 7 Here and in the sequel, it is straightforward to check that the second order condition for maximum is ful…lled. 8 As noticed above our approach and the analysis in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) di¤er at this point. In their framework, delegation would not improve ressource allocation because the service provider's …xed income does not re ‡ect the expected future pay from renegotiation. Whereas delegation could improve incentives in their analysis the principal would …nd it too costly and she would choose not to delegate.
The incentive e¤ect improves e¢ ciency. In fact, when the preferred agent puts positive weight on quality (i.e. the solution is interior), then delegation can o¤set all distortions following from contractual incompleteness under mandatory inhouse provision. Delegation perfectly substitutes for a complete incentive contract in this environment of incomplete contracts. Principals with lower p would prefer to delegate to extreme types a < 0; who cannot be found in the population. For such principals, delegation improves the situation without removing all distortions.
We have shown 
Outsourcing.
Under outsourcing, the service is produced by a private …rm. Again we start by considering the case of no delegation, where the principal is the decision maker of the government. The principal and a private …rm …rst conclude a contract stipulating that the …rm produces the service for the price p 0 and bears the associated costs. The contract can be renegotiated, but it cannot be terminated prematurely. Then the …rm exerts e¤ort on plans for cost reduction. Just like under inhouse provision, cost reductions hurts the quality of the service. Again e¤ort cannot be contracted upon ex-ante and a complete contract on quality cannot be written. We assume that with probability ; the cost savings hurt the quality in ways which are veri…able and the principal can blok the implementation of the cost savings arguing that it breaks the contract since quality is lowered. In this case, the …rm needs the approval of the principal in order to implement the cost reduction, so renegotiation takes place, just as it was the case with the public manager. However, the principal cannot by itself terminate the contract with the …rm prematurely and implement the plans through contracting with another …rm. If negotiations break down, the result is, therefore, that the …rm continues providing the service, but the cost reduction is not implemented. Hence, the …rm is needed in order to reap the surplus from the cost reduction and in the renegotiation the …rm will appropriate 1=2 of the surplus from the cost reduction. The surplus from the cost reduction is e p e: This is shared among the two parties, so the …rm pays the principal a transfer t such that the …rm's gain from the implementation e t equals the principal's gain t p e: This means that the transfer is
With probability 1 it is not veri…able that quality has been reduced, so the principal cannot block the cost reduction and the …rm appropriates the full cost savings. We assume that the likelihood that the principal can block cost reductions is low, re ‡ecting the fact that we consider an environment where complete contracting is impossible. In particular, we assume that 0 < 1=2: 9
The …rm's expected payo¤ is therefore
Comparing (6) and (13) 
Cost reductions are larger under outsourcing than under inhouse provision. Contrary to the …rm, the public manager has no direct interest in cost reductions and takes to some extent into account that they hurt the principal. The …rm only takes the principal's interests into account because there is a chance the principal can force renegotiation. If the principal cares su¢ cently much about quality, the e¤ort under outsourcing is larger than …rst best
The principal's expected utility from outsourcing is
The joint surplus of the principal and the …rm from outsourcing is
Inserting gives that for p 1= it is
We envision outsourcing through a bidding process, where the lowest bidder wins the contract. The winning price depends on the competitive environment. If the government is a large buyer in a market with a competitive selling side, it is reasonable to assume that the price 9 It is worth noticing, that Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assume that it is impossible for the …rm to block cost reductions, in our notation this is the case where = 0:
will equal the competitive price, where the government reaps the whole surplus from outsourcing. 10 If, however, competition is weak and the …rms are able to collude the outcome will not be competitive. Suppose many local governments face a monopolistic …rm, the …rm then has signi…cant bargaining power. If a local government invites tenders, the …rm will only need to submit a bid, which exactly makes the principal indi¤erent between outsourcing and producing in-house. In this case the private monopoly will reap the surplus from outsourcing. The degree of market power, , determines the …rm's share of the surplus: If = 1; the …rm reaps all surplus -the monopoly case -if = 0 the principal reaps all surplus -the perfectly competitive case, for intermediate values of the surplus is shared. The principal's utility from outsourcing is therefore
from which it is clear that the principal outsources when the joint surplus is positive. Let
We then have
Proposition 2 Under no delegation, a principal of type p outsources if and only if her valuation of quality, p ; does not exceed the threshold G ( ; ; ) :
Outsourcing involves a trade-o¤. The private …rm will spend more e¤ort than the public manager in order to reduce costs but this lowers quality. In face of this trade o¤ principals who care less for quality outsource while principals who care more for quality do not. The higher is , the more severe is the trade-o¤ and the smaller is the threshold value of p ; G ( ; ; ) : The treshold also depends on ; the share of the surplus which cannot be realized without the present public manager. The higher ; the lower is the treshold and the less is the chance that a principal outsources. The reason is that a higher makes for better incentives for the public manager, so the disadvantage of inhouse production is reduced. Hence, Proposition 2 implies that one should see more outsourcing of less technical tasks like cleaning etc. We also see that the higher is the probability the principal can block cost reductions, ; the higher is G and the more likely is outsourcing. In this case the private …rm's incentives to reduce costs are diminished and the principal's chance of reaping part of the surplus from cost reductions are increased.
Furthermore, the outsourcing decision is independent of the competitiveness of the marketdoes not enter in condition in Proposition 2. While perhaps surprising at …rst sight, the reason is straightforward: Outsourcing takes place when the surplus from outsourcing is positive. Market power does not a¤ect the existence of the surplus, it only a¤ects how it is split. 
As the surplus decreases in p for p G ( ; ), the price does as well. Principals who value quality more are more hurt by the quality reductions from the private …rm's cost reductions.
The principal's quality preference a¤ ects the outsourcing price. When the principal is of type p = G ( ; ; ) ; she values quality so much that the outsourcing surplus is zero. Facing such a principal; regardless of the degree of market power, ; the …rm can only get a contract if p 0 =
2 .
Delegation under mandatory outsourcing
Here inhouse provision is not an option but the principal can delegate the authority to contract and renegotiate with the …rm. Mandatory outsourcing does not make much sense, if the market is not fully competitive and the price is determined as described above. Then the principal would fall prey to the market power of the …rm. But if there is perfect competition among the …rms, or the earnings of the …rm are capped, for instance determined by law, this is not an issue.
In this case the price is determined so that the …rm receives the value of its outside option which we have normalized to zero (possibly plus a stipulated …xed pro…t, )
When the …rm faces an agency with preference a the optimal e¤ort level is given by e o (( a ; ; )), cf. (13) . The price, p 0 ( a ; ; ) ; is determined so that (21) ; her worry is that the …rm spends too much e¤ort on cost reductions, which hurts quality too much. If the …rm were to renegotiate with the principal, its e¤ort level would be above …rst best, as is clear from (15) . In this case the optimal delegation is to an agency which puts even more weight on quality. This agency will not reward the …rm so much for high e¤ort if renegotiation occurs. The …rm's incentives to put in e¤ort are reduced and it responds by reducing e¤ort. If on the other hand, p < 2 1 ; the …rm's e¤ort level would still be below …rst best if she were facing the principal. In this case, the principal strengthens the incentives by delegating to an agency, who cares less about quality.
Again the incentive e¤ect improves e¢ ciency. For interior solutions where the second line in (23) In this case delegation substitutes for a complete incentive contract.
The outsourcing decision under partial delegation
In this section we consider the case, where the principal retains the decision to outsource or not but delegates the authority to renegotiate with the chosen service provider to an agent. When the mode of provision is chosen -and the initial contract is signed -the principal chooses the best agent to conduct the renegotiation. The best agent then depends on the chosen mode of provision, just as it was the case under mandatory inhouse provision and mandatory outsourcing.
In the price negotiations with the private …rm both parties realize this.
As is clear from Propositions 1 and 3, the optimal choices of agents depend on whether the service is outsourced or not. We have to consider three cases, depending on whether 0 < p < 2 1 ;
In the latter case, the principal can acheive …rst best through inhouse provision and appropriate all surplus, since the manager is hired in the competitive market. In this case, inhouse provision is clearly optimal for the principal and the outsourcing surplus is zero. Since …rst best can also be achieved through outsourcing, as is clear from Proposition 3 the principal is in fact indi¤erent between the modes in this case.
When 0 < p < 2 1 ; the optimal choice of agent involves a = 0 in both cases. From (6) and (13) we see that the e¤ort under inhouse provision is smaller than the e¤ort under outsourcing, e in = 2 < 1 2 = e out < e = 1 p : The larger e¤ort under outsourcing makes for an outsourcing surplus and the principal's optimal choice is therefore outsourcing. When p ; the principal can realize …rst best through inhouse provision, and therefore there is no outsourcing surplus. The principal can also realize …rst best through outsourcing in this case. If inhouse provision is chosen the optimal choice of agent is given by (12) . If outsourcing is chosen, the optimal choice of agent is given by (23) .
Notice that if a principal of a type p > 1 2 1 chooses outsourcing, this may involve choosing an agent, who cares very much about quality if the contracting environment with the …rm features a large degree of incompleteness, i.e. if is low. If such an agent with a very high a does not exist in the population, only inhouse provision is optimal.
Outsourcing is a better option under partial delegation than under no delegation. The reason is that the principal can take advantage of the incentive e¤ect in two ways. First it makes outsourcing more e¢ cient, secondly it also makes inhouse provision more e¢ cient. The last e¤ect implies that the principal's bargaining position towards the private …rm is strengthened.
This also makes outsourcing more interesting.
; then G (( ; ; )) < 1 2 1 and inhouse provision is optimal for a smaller range of 0 p s under partial delegation than under no delegation.
Arm' s Length Delegation
As discussed in the Introduction, delegation can be an institutional choice as in the case of representative democracy. However, it can also be the only feasible arrangement, since political leaders have limited amounts of time and necessarily have to delegate many tasks to subordinates, including decisions on service provision. In these cases the principal delegates to an agent, who both decides on outsourcing, the hiring of and the recontracting with the service provider. Under arm's length delegation, the agent is the decision maker for all decisions and the principal is aware that agents with a above G ( ; ; ) will outsource, while those with lower a will choose inhouse provision, as we know from Proposition 1.
When agent a outsources, the price is determined so that the …rm's share of the outsourcing surplus is : Hence
and this implies that
The principal's most preferred agent among those who outsources maximizes v out a j p ; ; on 0 a G ( ; ; ). The principal's most preferred among those who prefer inhouse provision maximizes v in a j p ; ; (as given in (11)) on a G ( ; ; ). Let 
where al a p ; ; ; = G ( ; ; ) denotes that the agent chooses outsourcing and al a p ; ; ; = G ( ; ; ) + that he chooses inhouse provision 11 . We thus have:
Proposition 5 Under arm's length delegation, the principal delegates to an agent who takes the same outsourcing decision as she would herself. Principal 0 p s preferred agent, al a p ; ; ; ; is given by (24) : If the principal prefers inhouse provision, she chooses an agent who cares less about quality than herself. If she prefers outsourcing, the optimal agents cares more about quality than the principal i¤ p > max[0;
Principals with a low preference for quality, who prefer outsourcing, take two e¤ects into account. Just as was the case with mandatory outsourcing, they take advantage of the incentive e¤ ect. If the …rm has no market power, so that = 0; we see that the delegation is to exactly the same type as with mandatory outsourcing, compare with (23) . However, when the …rm has market power and > 0; the principal also takes the bargaining e¤ ect into account. 1 ; encounter the problem that the preferred agent under mandatory inhouse provision would wish to outsource. Hence, the principal modi…es the choice of agent to a type who just chooses inhouse provision. This still allows some incentive e¤ect. Principals with even higher preference for quality do not encounter this problem, their most preferred agent also prefers inhouse provision.
Arm's length delegation does not change the outsourcing decision: Principals delegate to an agent, who makes the same decision on outsourcing as the principal would herself. The intuition for this result is the following: For principals, who just prefer outsourcing, the bargaining e¤ ect dominates and induces the pricipal to choose an agent who values quality more than herself. For a principal who just prefers inhouse provision, the incentive e¤ ect induces her to choose an agent who values quality less. Consider a principal of type G ( ; ; ) + "; where " is very small. Even though she could get (almost) as good a bargain with the private …rm as agent G ( ; ; ) ; she prefers inhouse provision under no delegation. When she delegates, she will, therefore, not be interested in delegating to agent G ( ; ; ) who outsources and essentially gets the same deal as she could have obtained herself. Similarly, principal G ( ; ; ) " prefers outsourcing under no delegation even though she herself would induce (almost) as strong incentives for the public manager as the lowest type agent, who chooses inhouse production, type G ( ; ; ) + . Type G ( ; ; ) " will therefore not be interested in delegating to an agent, who chooses inhouse provision.
The e¤ort level under Arm's length delegation, when inhouse provision is chosen and a = G It is straightforward to check that this e¤ort level is lower than the e¤ort level under no delegation (given by (13) for p G) and that is is lower than the …rst best level 1 p .
Except for extreme principals with very low p ; p < out e nd < e ; > 0 out e nd < e < e ; > 0 out e < e nd < e ; > 0 2 1 ; 2 1 out e nd < e ; > 0 out e = e ; > 0 out e < e nd < e ; > 0 2 1 ; G out e nd > e ; > 0 out e = e ; > 0 out e < e nd < e ; > 0 G; 1 2 1 in e nd < e ; < 0 out e = e ; > 0 in e nd < e < e ; < 0 1 2 1 ;
4 (2 ) 4 1 in e nd < e ; < 0 out/in e = e ; = 0 in e nd < e < e ; < 0 4 (2 ) 4 1 ;
1 in e nd < e ; < 0 out/in e = e ; = 0 in e = e ; < 0 For all types of principals, except principals with very low preference for quality, p < 2 1 ; the …rst best e¤ort level is obtained under Partial Delegation. The reason is that partial delegation allows the principal to exploit the incentive e¤ ect fully and this leads to e¢ ciency. Even with principals p < 2 1 ; partial delegation leads to e¤ort levels closer to the e¢ cient level than the other two modes.
Comparing no delegation and Arm's length delegation, Arm's length delegation is the most e¢ cient mode when the principal has a high preference for quality so that he prefer inhouse provision. For princiapls p > 4 2 + 4 1 full e¢ ciency is obtained. For other principals p > G; e¤ort is improved compared with no delegation but not all the way to full e¢ ciency. The reason is that the principal is constrained in her choice of agent. Full utilization of the incentive e¤ ect would require choosing an agent who would outsource, and this is not in the principal's interest. For principals, with lower p who prefer outsourcing, the e¢ ciency properties are opposite, here no delegation gives the most e¢ cient (although not fully e¢ cient) e¤ort choice. The resason is that when market power is not neglible, > N ( ; ; ) ; the principal dismisses the incentive e¤ ect and takes advantage of the bargaining e¤ect instead. As we saw this involves choosing an agent at the brink of choosing inhouse provision, this agent in fact gives less incentives to the …rm than the principal herself would.
We thus have Proposition 6 Assume that < 1=3 and market power is non-neglible, > Suppose the principal could choose the delegation institution, which one would she choose?
It it straightforward that any type of delegation is (weakly) better for the principal than nondelegation: She could choose a type equal to herself, thus mimicking non-delegation. Whenever she does something else, it is because it gives her higher utility. Partial delegation is (weakly)
better for the principal than either mandatory inhouse provision or mandatory outsourcing. The comparison between partial delegation and arm's length delegation is more involved. Partial delegation has the advantage that the principal needs not worry that the agent may outsource so she can take full advantage of the incentive e¤ ect. Arm's length delegation has the advantage she can use the bargaining e¤ ect but she may be forced to limit the use of the incentive e¤ ect. It is clear from Table 1 For the principal delegation (partial or arm's length) is better than no delegation. For principals with p > G; partial delegation is better than arm's length delegation. Principals with p < G prefer arm's length delegation if market power is su¢ ciently high (i.e. > K); otherwise they prefer partial delegation.
In principle, the principal can delegate the two tasks, outsourcing and renegotiation to two di¤erent agents, the case of double delegation. Not surprisingly, this is optimal for the principal.
She could mimick partial delegation as well as arm's length delegation if she wished to. Partial delegation leads to full e¢ ciency for interior solutions. One can show 13 that under double delegation the principal therefore delegates the renegotiation decision to the same kind of agent as under partial delegation and from an e¢ ciency point of view the two modes are equally good.
Double delegation gives the principal the advantage, that he can take full advantage of the bargaining e¤ect and the incentive e¤ect at the same time. Thus she obtains …rst best e¤ort and appropriates all surplus.
Conclusion
Most public service provision is done in environments where it is di¢ cult to contract upon on all future contingences. This paper has identi…ed two core e¤ects -the incentive and the bargaining e¤ects -that makes delegation an important feature in public service provision: First by strategically delegating the right to hire and negotiate with a service provider, the principal can manipulate the service provider's incentive. Strategic delegation essentially becomes a substitute for explicit incentive contracts. Second, by delegating the right to outsource to an agent that is indi¤erent between provision modes, the bargaining power of private …rms is lowered implying that delegation can reduce the price of private provision of public service.
The analysis gave a number of important results: First, the decision to outsource does not depend on the degree of competition among private service providers. If there is a joint surplus from outsourcing the outsourcing price will be adjusted so that outsourcing takes place.
Second, we showed that two empirical relevant ways of delegating the outsourcing decisionarm's length and partial delegation create more e¢ cient resource allocation than no delegation.
Third, partial delegation is better than arm's length delegation at creating e¢ ciency when the service is produced inhouse.
In representative democracies, most delegation will be arm's length where the electorate chooses a politician to be responsible for both the outsourcing decision and the negotiation with a private service provider. The results indicate that representative democracy is a better institution than a very hypothetical direct democracy where voters decide both on outsourcing 1 3 This is done in a previous version of the paper. and renegotiation. More interestingly partial delegation represents a case of direct referendum, where the electorate votes on outsourcing and delegates the implementation of the result to an elected politician. When voters prefer inhouse provision, this institution may be better for them than representative democracy. Our analysis thus shows that the institutions of democracy are important for provision of public services in modern democratic welfare states.
We have considered the case where the overwhelmingly important objective for the service provider is to cut costs. However, often improvement of the quality and development of the service is in focus. For instance in military procurement, it often appears that quality is a more important objective than cost, viz. e.g. the development of the Stealth …ghter. An interesting question is what thappens when the service provider has two tasks: Cost reductions and improvement of the service. This more general case is a mixture of the two simple cases where only one objective is present and the general results will depend on which objective is dominant. Still the incentive and bargaining e¤ects will be central and govern the choices of the principal. In a previous version of this paper, Bennedsen and Schultz (2008), we considered the more general case for the special parameter values = 1=2 and = 0 and where cost reductions were the more important of the two tasks. For this case, the results were qualitatively similar to those reported here.
